AGM are consistency and informative content. In fact, truth and truth approximation play no role at all in AGM, as the following telling quote by Gärdenfors (1988, p. 20) clearly reveals: OE: : : the concepts of truth and falsity are irrelevant for the analysis of belief systems. These concepts deal with the relation between belief systems and the external world, which I claim is not essential for an analysis of epistemic dynamics. OE: : : My negligence of truth may strike traditional epistemologists as heretical. However, one of my aims is to show that many epistemological problems can be attacked without using the notions of truth and falsity. 4 In spite of this, one may ask whether the AGM rules for belief change are effective means for approaching the truth (Niiniluoto 1999) .
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, the key ideas of PPV and AGM and their application to so called "propositional theories" will be illustrated. In Section 5.3 we will prove that, as far as propositional theories are concerned, AGM belief change is an effective tool for approaching the truth.
Post-Popperian Verisimilitude for Propositional Theories

Post-Popperian Theories of Verisimilitude
The intuitive idea underlying the concept of verisimilitude is that: a theory is highly verisimilar if it says many things about the domain under investigation and many of those things are true, or almost exactly true. One of the best known accounts of verisimilitude has been provided by Ilkka Niiniluoto (1987) . Niiniluoto's approach can be applied to theories stated in many kinds of language, including propositional and first-order languages. In this paper, however, we will only be concerned with theories stated within a propositional language L with n atomic propositions p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p n . Given an atomic proposition p m we will say that p m and :p m are the basic propositions -or b-propositions -associated to p m . The b-propositions of L form a set B D fp 1 ; :p 1 ; p 2 ; :p 2 ; : : : ; p n ; :p n g including 2n members. The most informative propositions of L are called constituents. A constituent C i is the most complete description of a possible world made by means of the expressive resources of L. In fact, for any atomic proposition p m ; C i tells whether p m is true or not. Hence, C i can be written in the following form: p 1^˙p2^: : :^˙p n ;
(5.1)
where "˙" is either empty or the negation symbol ":". Any b-proposition occurring in Eq. 5.1 will be called a basic claim -or b-claim -of C i . Moreover, we will say that each b-claim˙p m of C i is true in (the possible world described by) C i . The constituents of L form a set C D fC 1 ; C 2 ; : : : ; C q g including q D 2 n members. Moreover, one can check that: (i) C 1 ; C 2 ; : : : ; C q are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive; (ii) there is an unique true constituent, which will be denoted by "C "; (iii) any sentence T of L can be expressed in its normal disjunctive form as follows:
where T is the index set of the constituents entailing T . The so called "similarity approach" to verisimilitude is based on the idea that an appropriate measure of verisimilitude Vs.T / should express the similarity between T and "the truth" C or, equivalently, the closeness of T to C . The basic intuition underlying Niiniluoto's version of the similarity approach is that the verisimilitude Vs.T / of a theory T Á _ j 2T C j can be defined as a function of the distances between the disjuncts C j of T and C . The versions of the similarity approach based on this intuition may be called disjunctive versions (or d-versions) .
In Niiniluoto's d-version of the similarity approach, Vs.T / is defined as follows. First, a distance function is defined on the ordered couples .C i ; C j / of constituents of C by identifying ij Á .C i ; C j / with the number of the differences in the˙-signs between C i and C j , divided by n; i.e., with the number of the b-claims on which C i and C j disagree, divided by the total number of atomic propositions. This implies that 0 Ä ij Ä 1 and ij D 0 iff i D j . Second, an extended distance function .T; C i / is defined on all the couples .T; C i /, where the distance .T; C i / of T from C i is a function of the distances ij between the disjuncts C j of T and C i . Niiniluoto's favourite extended distance function .T; C i / is the so called min-sum distance function:
ms is normalized, the similarity s.T; C i / of T to C i can be simply defined as:
ms is a weighted sum of two simpler (extended) distances, the minimum distance min .T; C i / and the normalized sum distance sum .T; C i /. The minimum distance of T from C i is the distance from C i of the closest constituent entailing T , defined as: min .T; C i / D min j 2T ij . The normalized sum distance of T from C i is the sum of the distances from C i of all the constituents entailing T normalized with respect to the sum of the distances of all the elements of C
Finally, the degree of verisimilitude Vs 0 ms .T / of T can be defined as the similarity between T and "the truth" C : 
Applying PPV to Propositional Theories
According to the d-version of the similarity approach, the verisimilitude Vs.T / of a sentence T depends only on the distances between the states of affairs allowed by T -represented by the constituents C i which entail T -and the true state of affairs C . On the other hand, according to a recently proposed version of this approachwhich may be called the conjunctive version The key concept of the c-version of the similarity approach is the notion of conjunctive proposition -or c-proposition. C-propositions are possibly the simplest kind of "propositional theories", i.e., of theories stated within a propositional language L. 8 While a constituent C i specifies a complete list of the allegedly true b-propositions of L, a c-proposition T specifies a (possibly) incomplete list of such b-propositions. A c-proposition can be expressed in the following form:
where k T Ä n. Constituents are nothing but a special kind of c-proposition with k T D n; moreover, a tautology T can be seen as the c-proposition with k T D 0. Any b-proposition˙p m occurring in Eq. 5.6 will be called a b-claim of T . The set T C of all the b-claims of a c-proposition T will be referred to as the basic content -or b-content -of T . Given a constituent C i ; T C can be partitioned into two subsets: (1) the subset t.T; C i / of the b-claims of T which are true in C i , and 6 There are good reasons to think that any plausible measure of verisimilitude should respect (Vs.1-Vs.3) (see Niiniluoto 1987, pp 232-233) . 7 The c-version of the similarity approach presented here has been developed by Festa (2007a,b,c) , with respect to first-order and propositional languages. 8 C-propositions are essentially identical to "descriptive statements" or "D-statements" (Kuipers 1982, pp 348-349) and to "quasi-constituents" (Oddie 1986, p 86). (2) the subset f .T; C i / of the b-claims of T which are false in Ci. We may say that t.T; C i / is the true b-content of T w.r.t. C i , while f .T; C i / is the false b-content of T w.r.t. C i . Given a non-tautological c-proposition T , we will say that T is true in the case where t.T; C / D T C (and f .T; C / D ¿/ and that T is completely false in the case where t.T; C / D ¿ (and f .T; C / D T C /. T is false if some of its b-claims are false. The c-proposition Q T , given by the conjunction of the negations of all T 's b-claims, will be called the specular of T. It is easy to see that if T is true then Q T is completely false and viceversa, whereas if T is false then Q T too is false. Starting from the qualitative notions of true and false b-content of T w.r.t. C i , the corresponding quantitative notions of degree of true b-content cont t .T; C i / and degree of false b-content cont f (T; Ci) of T w.r.t. C i can be introduced as follows:
The similarity s £ .T; C i / of T to C i can then be defined as a weighted average of cont t .T; C i / and cont f .T; C i /, where cont t .T; Ci/ is construed as the prize attributed to the true b-content of T w.r.t. C i and cont f .T; C i / as the penalty attributed to the false b-content of T w.r.t. C i :
where 0 < £ Ä 1=2. The verisimilitude of T; Vs £ .T /, is then identified with the similarity between T and the true constituent C :
In order to state some interesting features of Vs £ , it is useful to introduce the notions of verisimilar sentences and of sentences which are distant from the truth-or t-distant sentences. 9 To this purpose, we shall say that a c-proposition T is verisimilar in the case where Vs £ .T / > 0 and that T is t-distant in the case where Vs £ .T / < 0. Some relevant consequences of Eqs. 5.8 and 5.9 can now be proved: Theorem 1. Given a c-proposition T of the form˙p 1 T^˙p 2 T^: : :^˙p k T :
AGM Belief Change for Propositional Theories
The AGM Theory of Belief Change
Within the AGM theory of belief change, the epistemic state of an ideal agent X is represented by a belief set or theory, i.e., by a deductively closed set of sentences.
More precisely, given a language L, an operation of logical consequence Cn defined on L, and a set K of sentences within L, the notion of belief set is defined as follows:
K is a belief set if and only if Cn.K/ D K:
Although the notion of belief set in Eq. 5.10 includes also inconsistent belief sets, AGM theorists adopt the following principle of consistency:
The belief set K of an ideal agent X should be consistent.
Suppose that the epistemic state of X is represented by a consistent belief set K. Then X can have one of the following epistemic attitudes towards a sentence A of L:
i X accepts A in the case where A 2 K; ii X rejects A in the case where :A 2 K; iii X suspends the judgment on A -or, equivalently, A is undetermined for X -in the case where both A … K and :A … K.
The basic purpose of AGM is to provide a plausible account of how an ideal agent X should update his belief set K in response to certain epistemic inputs coming from some information source. Given a sentence A, two kinds of epistemic input concerning A are considered within AGM:
(a) Additive inputs, which can be expressed as orders of the form "Add A to your belief set!". (b) Eliminative inputs, which can be expressed as orders of the form "Remove A from your belief set!".
Below, the additive input "Add A to your belief set!" and the eliminative input "Remove A from your belief set!" will also be denoted by the shorter expressions "additive input A" and "eliminative input A", respectively.
Suppose that X receives the additive input "Add A to your belief set!". Of course, if A already belongs to K -i.e., if X already accepts A -then X 's appropriate response is keeping K unchanged. However, there are two more interesting cases where A … K: Expansion. A is compatible with K, i.e., :A … K. In this case, the epistemic operation by which X should update K by the addition of A is called expansion, and the expanded belief set is denoted by "K C A ". Revision. A is incompatible with K, i.e., :A 2 K. In this case, the epistemic operation by which X should update K by the addition of A is called revision, and the revised belief set is denoted by "K A ".
Below, we will call "addition" the generic operation of updating K by an additive input A. Hence, the addition of A to K will be either the expansion of K by A, in the case where A is compatible with K, or the revision of K by A, in the case where A is incompatible with K. Now suppose that X receives the eliminative input "Remove A from your belief set!". If A does not belong to K -i.e., X rejects, or suspends the judgment on, A-X's appropriate response consists is keeping K unchanged. However, the more interesting case where A 2 K may occur:
Contraction. If A 2 K, the epistemic operation by which X should update K by the removal of A is called contraction, and the contracted belief set is denoted by "K A ".
AGM theorists have made systematic efforts aiming to show how, given a belief set K and a sentence A, an ideal agent X could specify the updated belief sets K C A ; K A and K A . A basic intuition underlying the AGM approach is expressed by the following general principle of rationality, known as the principle of minimal change:
(MC) When the belief set K of an ideal agent X is updated in response to a given epistemic input, a minimal change of K should be accomplished. This means that X should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible and start to believe as few new beliefs as possible.
There are many alternative ways of defining K C A ; K A and K A in accordance with the general principles of consistency and minimal change. For this reason, Gärdenfors (1988) has proposed a number of adequacy conditions -the so called Gärdenfors postulates -that any appropriate definition of K C A ; K A and K A should satisfy. For instance, the "Success" postulate for revision says that A 2 K A . However, it should be noted that the Gärdenfors postulates alone cannot fully determine the result of any belief change. Suppose, for example, that an agent X receives the additive input A. If X 's theory K includes :A, then X has to revise K by A. This means that :A must be removed from K, in order to guarantee both that A 2 K Aas required by the Success postulate -and that K A is consistent -in agreement with (C). Moreover, X has to remove from K not only :A but -due to the definition (Eq. 5.10) of belief set -also any set of sentences entailing :A. Since there are normally many alternative ways to fulfill this task, the choice of one of them will depend on the relative "importance" that X attaches to the sentences in K. In this connection, one may assume that the elements of K are ordered with respect to their so called epistemic entrenchment (Gärdenfors and Makinson 1988) . When X has to remove some sentences from K, he will choose the less entrenched in agreement with appropriate selection rules.
A well known method for defining the operations of expansion, revision and contraction in accordance with the Gärdenfors postulates and with entrenchment-based selection rules has been provided by Grove (1988) . For the sake of brevity, below we will outline Grove's method only with reference to expansion and revision. 10 Grove shows that, given a propositional language L, any belief set K in L is identical to the set of all the logical consequences of some sentence T of L -i.e., is identical to the so called consequence class Cn.T /. Hence, a generic belief set or "theory" may be identified with the corresponding sentence T of L, expressed in its normal disjunctive form as T Á _ j 2T C j . An epistemic entrenchment relation can be defined on the sentences of L by ordering the constituents of C with respect to their relative closeness or similarity to the elements of T. Niiniluoto (1999) shows that such an ordering is easily obtained in the case where a suitable distance function is defined on the constituents of L (see Section 5.1.1). In fact, the distance i .T / of a constituent C i from a theory T may be defined
Moreover, given an epistemic input A, the set C T .A/ of the closest constituents to T entailing A is defined as: 
Applying AGM to Propositional Theories
Now we will show how the basic principles of AGM can be applied to the definition of T C A and T A in the case where both T and A are c-propositions. To this purpose, we have to introduce some preliminary notions concerning T and its logical relations with A. First of all, recall that T C is the set of all b-claims of T , i.e., the set of all b-propositions occurring in T . The set of the negations of the elements of T C will be denoted by "T ", whereas the set of the b-propositions which occur neither in T C nor in T will be denoted by "T ‹ ". 12 Note that the sets T C ; T and T ‹ form a partition of the set B of the 2n b-propositions of L. Suppose that the agent X receives the additive input A. In order to understand how X should update his belief set T in response to A, one should note that the logical relations between T and A depend on how A C overlaps the partition fT C ; T ; T ‹ g. For this reason, it is useful to introduce the notions of the "redundant", "conflicting" and "extra" part of A with respect to T , as follows. Given two c-propositions T and A, the following related c-propositions are defined: Below, the conflicting and the extra parts of A w.r.t. T will be also referred to as the "non-redundant parts" of A w.r.t. T . Note that the three sets A C \ T C ; A C \ T and A C \ T ‹ form a partition of A C . Hence, A can be written as A rT^AcT^AxT and, in the same way, T can be written as T rA^TcA^TxA . The following properties of the c-propositions A rT ; A cT and A xT defined above are worth noting. First, A rT is identical to T rA , by definition. Moreover, it is easy to see that A cT D Q T cA and T cA D Q A cT -i.e., that the conflicting part of A w.r.t. T is the specular of the conflicting part of T w.r.t. A, and vice versa. Finally, A xT and T xA share by definition no common conjuncts.
The above notions can be used to prove the following theorems concerning expansion and revision 13 :
Theorem 4. If the additive input A is compatible with T , in the sense that
A C \ T D ¿, then T C A D T^A.
Theorem 5. If the additive input A is incompatible with T , in the sense that
A consequence of Theorem 4 is worth noting here. First, recalling that A rT D T rA , one can see that the information A rT is already conveyed by T . Second, since A is compatible with T by hypothesis, the conflicting part of A w.r.t. T is emptyi.e., A C \ T D ¿ and A cT D T cA D T. From these two facts, it follows that the conjunction of T with A is identical to the conjunction of T with the extra part of A w.r.t. T . Hence, Theorem 4 implies that T C A D T^A xT .
12 If T is the theory of an agent X, then T C ; T , and T ‹ can be seen as the set of the b-propositions which X accepts, rejects, and on which suspends the judgment, respectively. 13 These theorems are proved in Cevolani et al. (forthcoming) together with a number of results about contraction.
Is AGM Belief Change a Road to Verisimilitude?
We can now come back to the question considered at the beginning of the paper, i.e., the question whether the AGM rules for belief change are effective means for approaching the truth. This question may be now rephrased as follows: are AGM expansion and revision effective means for approaching the truth? 14 Niiniluoto (1999) investigates this problem with respect to his favored verisimilitude measure Vs 0 ms , introduced in Section 5.1.1. In particular, Niiniluoto asks in which cases expansion and revision lead our theories closer to the truth or, in other words, in which cases, given a theory T and an additive input A; T Niiniluoto's results above concern the expansion and the revision of theories expressed in propositional and first-order languages. Theorem 3 shows that the simple addition of true epistemic inputs to such theories doesn't necessarily lead them closer to the truth. In this regard, one can say that expansion and revision are not effective means for approaching the truth, at least as far Vs 0 ms is concerned. However, a different conclusion can be reached if we restrict our attention to a special kind of propositional theories, i.e., c-propositions. In this case, we can specify various cases where expansion and revision are effective means for approaching the truth. Accordingly, from now on we will assume that both the theory T and the epistemic input A are c-propositions. The following theorems state the conditions under which expansion and revision increase the verisimilitude of a theory T with respect to the verisimilitude measure Vs £ introduced in Section 5.1.2.
Theorem 8. Given a theory T , suppose that A is compatible with T and
Theorem 9. Given a theory T , suppose that A is incompatible with T . Then:
In order to grasp the intuitive meaning of Theorem 9, recall that, by hypothesis, A is incompatible with T , i.e., that the conflicting part of T w.r.t. A is not empty. According to Theorem 5, the revision of T by A replaces such conflicting part T cA D Q A cT with A cT and adds A xT to T . Now suppose that Vs .A cT / < Vs . Q A cT /. Then the difference Vs . Q A cT / Vs .A cT / can be construed as the loss of verisimilitude due to the addition of the conflicting part of A to T . However, if the extra part of A outweighs this loss -i.e., if Vs .A xT / > Vs . Q A cT / Vs .A cT / -then the revised theory T A will still be more verisimilar than T .
Recalling that, according to Theorem 1, if A is true then A is verisimilar, whereas if A is completely false then A is t-distant, one can now prove some interesting consequences of Theorems 8 and 9. First, the addition of true inputs to (false) theories always increases their verisimilitude: Theorem 10. Suppose that A is true. Then:
Second, if the non-redundant parts of A w.r.t. T are verisimilar, then the addition of A to T leads T closer to the truth: Theorem 11. Suppose that A cT and A xT are verisimilar. Then:
To sum up, expansion and revision are effective means for approaching the truth, as far as c-propositions and the verisimilitude measure Vs £ are concerned, in the following sense. First, the addition of true inputs to (false) theories leads to more verisimilar theories. Second, the addition of inputs whose non-redundant parts are verisimilar also increases the verisimilitude of the original theory.
Finally, one may consider another aspect of AGM's effectiveness for approaching the truth which is not discussed by Niiniluoto (1999) . In fact, Theorems 10 and 11 concern the expansion and the revision of T by true inputs or by inputs whose nonredundant parts are verisimilar. However, one might ask what happens in the case where T is expanded or revised by inputs which are completely false or whose nonredundant parts are t-distant. In such cases, it seems plausible to expect that the 18 The proviso is needed in order to exclude the trivial case where A is already contained in T , i.e., the case where
expansion and the revision of T by A leads to theories which are less verisimilar than T . An answer to this question is provided by the following theorems. First, one can prove that the addition of completely false inputs to T leads to a less verisimilar theory, as the following result (which is the counterpart of Theorem 3) states: Theorem 12. Suppose that A is completely false. Then:
Moreover, if the non-redundant parts of A are t-distant, the expansion of T by A is less verisimilar than T : 
Consider two c-propositions
Proof of Theorem 9. Let us prove the following result: 
